

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 148144
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:ARAPHEL:SO
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
NEA:HHSAUNDERS
T/D:JNYE
PM:RERICKSON
P: DNEWSOM
ACDA:CVANDOREN
S/S:PTARNOFF
EUR - MR VINE

-----026238 102002Z /63

O 102004Z JUN 78 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 148144

NODIS

E.O. 11652:XGDS-1

TAGS: PK, MNUC, TECH, FR, US

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: PARIS 18090

1. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER
FROM THE SECRETARY TO DE GUIRINGAUD.

2. DEAR MR. MINISTER: I FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS DURING THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 148144

NATO MEETING VERY USEFUL, AND AM ESPECIALLY GRATIFIED WITH
THE POSITION FRANCE IS TAKING NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT BY PAKISTAN.
I REALIZE THE DECISION, WHICH I HOPE YOU WILL SOON BE
PASSING TO THE PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES, IS A DIFFICULT ONE.
I WISH TO REITERATE THAT WE WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO LIMIT ANY DAMAGE, IN THE WAKE OF

YOUR DECISION, TO PAKISTAN'S TIES WITH THE WEST OR TO THE RELATIONS OF OUR TWO NATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.

AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HAS INFORMED ME OF YOUR CONCERN THAT STRAINS IN FRENCH/PAKISTANI RELATIONS AFTER PAKISTAN LEARNS OF YOUR DECISION BE MINIMIZED, AND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ALSO BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THE EFFECTS OF THE DECISION DOMESTICALLY. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT WE WILL BOTH BE CRITI-

CIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, AND IT IS THEREFORE IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST THAT WE DO WHAT WE CAN TO CONTAIN AN INTEMPERATE PAKISTANI REACTION.

AS WE CONSIDER THE BEST WAY TO MODERATE THE PAKISTANI RESPONSE, AND TO ENSURE THAT OUR VARIOUS INTERESTS IN THAT COUNTRY ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED, I WANT TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT A BASIC TENET OF THE U.S. APPROACH WILL BE TO AVOID, TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, ACTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO FRENCH INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN.

I CAN APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT FINANCING FOR THE SALE OF FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN. I MUST POINT OUT THAT, AS AMBASSADOR HARTMAN INDICATED TO YOU, WE ARE LEGALLY PROHIBITED FROM USING U.S. GOVERNMENT CREDITS FOR THE SALE OF NON-U.S. EQUIPMENT. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT SINCE WE LIFTED OUR SOUTH ASIAN ARMS SALES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 148144

EMBARGO IN 1975, WE HAVE NOT FINANCED THE SALE OF ANY U.S. ORIGIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO EITHER PAKISTAN OR INDIA; ALL SALES HAVE BEEN ON A CASH-ONLY BASIS.

WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE OTHER POSSIBLE CREDIT SUPPLIERS WHO COULD FINANCE FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES WHICH STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND PERHAPS OTHER GULF STATES MAY BE WILLING TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT THINK IT ADVISABLE TO APPROACH THOSE GOVERNMENTS NOW; WE AGREE THAT YOUR DECISION NOT TO PROVIDE THE REPROCESSING PLANT MUST BE CLOSELY HELD AND WE WANT TO AVOID ATTRACTING PREMATURE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO IT. I CAN ASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE PAKISTANIS WANT TO PURCHASE FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO MEET LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS, WE WILL ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE REGIONAL STATES TO FINANCE SUCH SALES.

AS DR. NYE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JACOMET RECENTLY, WE ARE WORKING ON A SET OF PROPOSALS WHICH WE COULD, IN COORDINATION WITH FRANCE, OFFER PAKISTAN AS AN INDUCEMENT NOT TO PROCEED ON ITS OWN WITH REPROCESSING. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT YET HAVE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ALL ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE,

ONE IMPORTANT COMPONENT WOULD BE U.S. SUPPORT, GIVEN THE
ABSENCE OF A U.S./PAKISTANI BILATERAL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT,
FOR THE SALE OF A FRENCH POWER REACTOR TO PAKISTAN. AL-
THOUGH WE FACE THE SAME CONSTRAINTS ON FINANCING REACTOR
SALES AS WE DO MILITARY EQUIPMENT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT
WE WILL DO WHATEVER WE CAN IN ISLAMABAD TO ENCOURAGE THE
SALE OF FRENCH EQUIPMENT OF THIS SORT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU AGAIN DURING THE OECD

DELIBERATIONS AND WILL BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH
YOU FURTHER AT THAT TIME. SINCERELY, CYRUS VANCE. VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, CONTRACTS, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, MILITARY SALES, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE148144
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ARAPHEL:SO
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840128-2176
Format: TEL
From: STATE NEA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780672/aaaackfc.tel
Line Count: 127
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 12a6bf8b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 PARIS 18090
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2402908
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PAKISTAN REPROCESSNG PLANT
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, PPDC, PK, FR, US, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (GUIRINGAUD, LOUIS DE)
To: PARIS ISLAMABAD MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbcc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/12a6bf8b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014